Politics of Time
The Question of Time and the Projects of the Société des observateurs de l'homme

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The Question of time and the projects of the Société des observateurs de l’homme (= SOH)

What could it mean to „save“ the Enlightenment? Which is the role of rhetorics of a polarized field (enemies and friends of the Enlightenment) for the politics of the production of knowledge within the humanities in the post cold-war western academic world? These are the two questions which we want to discuss by means of two case studies.

Stephen Bronner opens his book Reclaiming the Enlightenment: Toward a politics of radical engagement (2004), which is meant to be a commentary to the Dialectic of Enlightenment, by mentioning 9/11 – for him the emblem of the attacks on a declining western system of values. A reappropriation of the Enlightenment is meant to recover an intellectual coherence for „purposeful politics“ and to defend the Enlightenment against left and right-wing „enemies“. This approach has recently been developed further by Jonathan Israel in the field of the history of ideas. He referred to Bronner by underpinning the essential role of the „radical enlightenment“ for modern democracy after 1945. Both authors think that the universalism of the Enlightenment, i.e. its secular egalitarianism, should be defended. This is not necessarily inventive, since we know this attitude from a lot of 18th-century texts.

What does it mean, however, to dichotomize the talk about the Enlightenment according to the either-or pattern and thus to close the debate about the Enlightenment?

Our paper will propose a counter perspective to this historiography, which produces a hasty actualization of Enlightenment principles and is based on the concept of the solid rationality of the humanities without problematizing its apriori as a problem of exclusion strategies. We want to investigate competing forms of production of knowledge as locally situated projects and to analyze their historical apriori.

We will accordingly try to answer three questions:

In what sense is it „enlightening“ for an investigation of the politics of knowledge to discuss the time-structure produced by this knowledge? What kind of relation can be found between the time-structure of knowledge and the interrelated politics? We are aware of the fact that we can only talk about the production of time and of temporality with the proviso that we have to include the co-production of space. Nevertheless, we want to limit ourselves to the investigation of a specific politics of time, i.e. the politics of the infinity of projects within the field of knowledge production.

The second question follows from this. What is the relation between the investigation of the time-structure of projects and the project of the investigation itself (i.e. the present text)? What does it mean for the politics of studies within the humanities to interprete
the problem of reflexivity as a demand for symmetry of object and investigation and to integrate this problem into the current research project?

This entails the third cluster of questions: What is the use and the politics of the differentiation between language as instrument of description and a historical object independent of this language, which could be comprehended to a lesser or to a higher degree by a certain methodology? We would not only point out, that certain practices of differentiation (like language) are „constructed“ (what certainly is correct), but we would also like to do justice to the fact that we are situated in a certain historical configuration. Our project is part of a contingent configuration, which allows us to produce knowledge by the support of the „Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft“ (German Research Foundation = DFG) about the „epistemologies of the knowledge of man“. How does this contingency become important as a resource for localization and contextualization of the production of knowledge in the field of humanities? Although all of these questions seemed important to us, we can not answer all of them in this paper. Nevertheless it is crucial to raise these questions, in order to demarcate our field of interest.

These questions form the background of two case-studies, each describing two infinite projects. The first case-study deals with two projects investigating deaf-mutes (ca. 1800). The second is about the genealogy of statistics during the same period.

Two epistemologies of the knowledge of language – the infinite project: „Il n'est rien à faire“

The investigation of language was a very important part of the project of the SOH. The production of knowledge about language was made possible by two different epistemologies, which we call organicistic and analytic epistemes. The scientific objects of the SOH in this context were the mad-men, the deaf-mutes and the figure of the „savage“. Both epistemes produced different forms of temporality and the project of each episteme was in a different way related to infinity and had thereby a different relation to the politics of time. We will have to limit ourselves to an outline of the research on deaf-mutes. Under the various revolutionary and post-revolutionary French regimes Roch-Ambroise Sicard, a deaf-mute pedagogue, managed to retain his position as director at the deaf-mute’s school in Paris after a period of exile under Robespierre. This school was the first state-funded deaf-mute’s school. It was first directed by Michel de l’Épée, who was an emblem in the field of studies about deaf-muteness. Sicard tried to develop further Épée’s method of instruction and created what he called the „methodical gesture language“, a system of signs, which should make possible the unequivocal connection between thing, sign, and idea. Talleyrand seemed to believe in the success of this venture. He was convinced, that this gesture language could help to guarantee public order and stability of the young republic by abolishing the ambiguities of traditional sign systems and by replacing them with clarity and certainty. In the opinion of Talleyrand one could think about introducing this gesture language on a national level.

The main epistemic techniques in constructing this gesture language were for Sicard observation and analysis. In his *Rapports sur l'instruction d'un Sourd-Muet de naissance* (1799) he presented his narrative of the observations of the education of his most famous student, Jean Massieu. It will not be possible to evaluate the status of this narrative and its relation to his actual practice conclusively. But there remains the formulation of a certain type of project. Sicard’s analytical project consisted in the collecting of as many *faits* (facts) as possible, which then should be put into an order by the analytical method of decomposition and composition. The description of this order would then be a grammar of nature. This would only be achievable if the observation of the deaf-mute was car-
ried out carefully. Then one could translate this grammar of nature into an arbitrary, artificial system of signs. This project was infinite. For the stabilization of the order of signs by observation could only be achieved by the continuous accumulation of faits (facts), which of course could never be completed. We characterize Sicard’s project as a cumulative analytical infinite one. As such it would, as Duquesnoy recognized, contribute to make the status quo permanent, because it had permanently to create and re-create the conditions of its own existence. At the same time it was necessarily bent on replacing all other forms of knowledge – which could not count as real knowledge – by this one and only truth.

Infinity in this cumulative analytical infinite sense is opposed to the organicistic iterative type of infinity characteristic for Jean Itard’s medical research on the language of deaf-mutes. Jean Itard was active as a doctor at the Paris deaf-mute’s school and reported his experiences in his book *Maladies de l'oreille et de l'audition* (1821). He argued for an approach centred around the concept of the individual sensibility of the ears. Each ear has its own sensibility, and the examination of patients should accordingly be differentiated. Itard developed this approach after his abortive attempts to educate Victor, the Wild Boy of Aveyron. Itard’s method can more adequately be described as fitting in with Wilhelm von Humboldt’s “Einfühlen” in an autonomous totality. It is certainly not fitting in with Sicard’s analytical method. A totality was thought to essentially retain its individual character although, of course, it could resemble other totalities. Itard’s collection of observations in the *Maladies* therefore had to respect the essential heterogeneity of things. The result, therefore, could not be the advancement towards the one and only truth, but a mapping of the infinite diversity of things in our world. Thus, this specific project by Itard (who used other methods in other texts) was of the organicistic iterative type and it was not inherently bound to colonize other rationalities. Of course, Itard’s project was interested in securing the possibilities for its existence. But it could be conceded that other objects of research could be subject to other procedures and that possibly other types of rationality could be useful. This does not mean, however, that Itard would not marginalize certain forms of human existence: He conceded only a low measure of “intelligence” to the deaf-mutes.

One could think that the difference between the two approaches could be explained by the difference between grammatical and medical research. As can be observed in Humboldt’s research on language, however, this does not have to be the case, but one has in each case to take into account the form and function of infinity and the relation with the time of a project.

**Time and state, two projects for the production of the present**

Another example for the production of historicity can be the comparison of two projects concerning the science of the state and of statistics. “State” will be understood as an object of knowledge. The state is the epistemological and institutional framework for the socio-political life of a given society and defined, what could legitimately be thought and done. The perception of the state underwent a certain process of transformation between 1789-1804. Within the perception of the state the production of temporality is a crucial element. From the apparatus of the sovereign’s power the state became an object of knowledge, which should be potentially accessible to all its subjects.

It is to be understood in this context, that a certain type of state always produces a certain type of temporality and vice versa – they are productive of each other. One central aspect of the transformation process of the perception of the state and time was the establishment of a scheme for structuring temporality. Statistics was about establishing a relation to the present. The object of statistics, man in the state, was no longer con-
ceived as part of a time extrinsic to him, but as a conscious producer of his own here and now. In what follows I will discuss two different forms of production of the temporality of the state around 1800 by constrasting two statistical projects, the permanent and the general statistics.

In 1805, the Ministry of the Interior ordered a report on the Bureau de Statistique which had been established by Chaptal in 1800. In the Ministry, it was Joseph Marie Degérando in his capacity as Observateur who wanted to know whether and how the Bureau de Statistique could be of use for the government. He asked for two reports of two officials who advocated competing concepts of statistics and of the temporality of the state. Chaptal had organized the Bureau according to the German tradition of statistics as a science of the present. He aimed at establishing a method to make the present social situation and its political options an object of science based on the analysis of the various momentary situations and their comparison. Statistics was conceived as an infinite project of a collection of faits, as the science of change. The time of change as analyzed by statistics did not correspond to any historical time of development, but rather to a logical time of comparison. Accordingly, in his report for Degérando, Duquesnoy, secretary of the Bureau de Statistique, declared as the main task of statistics and the Bureau to describe the situation in France in 1789 and to measure the changes achieved since then, so that a politics of “conservation, reparation and restauration” would be made possible. Temporality in these analyses of situations has a reiterative form. In the sequence of changes starting from the historical zero 1789, the single moments are meaningful not as singularities but only as part of a sequence of reiterations. Each single moment gains a solidity only in the framework of an emerging symmetrical tableau which makes it possible to survey the past, the present and the future at a single glance. The sequential recording of changes and the legibility of sequences within the context of an iterative concept of time made the value of the present absolute. For this, Alexandre Deferrière, director of the Bureau de Statistique, coined the concept of permanent statistics. Statistics as the science of change produced the “here and now”, and in this function it produced the state as an infinite project of knowledge. The infinity of the project produced the permanence of the state.

In the year in which Degérando asked the employees of the Bureau de Statistique to report on their work, he also ordered a report by an external expert, Emmanuel-Étienne Duvillard, who was an official in the audit division. Duvillard had become famous as the director of the Bureau d’arithmétique politique which had been founded under Condorcet in 1791. In 1806 he published his memorandum on the statistics of the Bureau de Statistique in which he criticized its work devastatingly. He reproached the Bureau for not having a conception of the necessity of relations between the accumulated facts and situations and for not being able to formulate general laws. For Duvillard it was necessary to have a measure by which the various official accounts could be falsified by a central authority, i.e. the Bureau. A Statistique générale de l’empire would only be possible if such a central calculation agency with trained calculators functioned successfully. Some ten years earlier, in the preliminary debates about the foundation of the Bureau d’arithmétique politique, Condorcet had formulated the ideas which were basic for Duvillard’s criticism of the Bureau de Statistique. He made a distinction between two possible ways of handling political problems, the one which only followed current facts and events, the other which treated them only as stimuli to formulate universal laws. The latter would – as the science of society – make it possible “to perceive the future in the present and in each single law the complete system of social order”. The chopped-off head of the king was to be replaced by a science of society that was able to formulate laws. To the law
of nature corresponded – in the science of morality and society – the calculation which produced a kind of temporality depreciating the present and advocating a future which was basically calculizable and to a certain degree real although inaccessible. Statistics would no longer be the science of the present, but develop as the science of the future included in the present, of an omnipresent future. The wealth of observations and collections of facts was displaced by the emptiness of a present which was structured by the law of the future, an inaccessible future which had to be included into the present by means of the infinite project of statistical calculation.

In the first case, the case of permanent statistics the present was symmetrically related to the past and to changes and thus made thinkable the future as the possibility of something new. In the second case (general statistics) the future, i.e. that which does not exist, became the organizing principle for the present. In both cases, statistics produced a relation to the present, and in both cases the projects are basically infinite although in a different sense. However, the projects constituted an attitude towards the present, an Ethos of Enlightenment which was fundamentally tied to the political form of the state.

Conclusion

If we ask for the coproduction of knowledge and its temporality in our case-studies the results will be ambivalent. A certain type of a politics of time can not necessarily be deduced from a certain type of temporality. We can, however, formulate the more careful and perhaps more prudent hypothesis that a certain temporality of a project serves a certain politics of time. We have argued that Sicard’s empirical research on language was a cumulative analytic project productive of a permanent accumulation of facts according to the same principles, whereas Itard’s iterative organicistic project made possible a form of infinite research, which – as one could say – in each case had to conceive a new project with its own lawlike regularities. On the contrary in the statistical projects the iterative analytic statistics were meant to contribute to making the present infinite. The general statistics made the law of the future – as statute of the present – the rule of the here and now. In the latter case we can speak of a cumulative organicistic project, which proclaimed a piecemeal development towards an inaccessible future.

For all these infinite projects the basic question was that for the possible relations and forms of past, present, and future. The various formations of the French state between 1789 and 1804 established different regimes of time. As object of knowledge the state was related to these regimes of time, which were a necessary precondition of the state’s knowledge and knowledge about the state. After 1804 the politics of time changed. For example the Académie Celtique (1804) replaced the “no” regarding the Ancien Régime by a “yes” for the more distant past of the celtic origins of the frenchmen. Therefore the period between 1795 and 1805 is of high relevance regarding the forms of the production of temporality. These are preliminary remarks outlining a far deeper analysis of the diverse rationalities of infinity and the related politics of time. For the present purpose, the analysis of contemporary projects of the humanities, these remarks may suffice.

We will now try to fulfill our introductory promise of symmetry by expanding the question of the time-structure of our historical object to our own project: Which time-structure is produced in DFG-Project Ep 19/4-1? Of which politics of time is it subject? It seemed to us that the logic of the research done within the humanities necessitates in an iterative manner the production of ever more projects, which at the same time obey their own lawlike regularities and fulfill the requirements of a general form of project. They can be considered as semi-dependant organicistic individualities which produce ritual
closure within an infinite sequence (the project Ep 19/4-1 should produce a closure but certainly is not meant to produce it definitely; the closure happens mostly in ritual cycles of about three or four years, formally represented by an *Abschlussbericht* (final report)). In contrast to the project of language research around 1800 or the project of permanent and general statistics, this infinite stringing together of individual results does not follow a strict or general plan and thus tends to produce an equal validity for all results (*Gleich-Gültigkeit*). The German *Gleich-Gültigkeit* has two contrasting meanings, i.e. “equal value” and “indifference” or “meaninglessness”. This captures what we think is the state of affairs in the humanities, at least in Germany. *Gleich-Gültigkeit* for us is a concept for the critical reassessment of the type of knowledge-production in the humanities. In this sense Ep 19/4-1 is a parasitic project participating in the infinity of German humanities and reproducing its structures at the same time formally in order to preserve itself. Thus, the humanities can be characterized as an infinite project to reproduce themselves, and in order to do so they have to mobilize regimes of infinity and of course produce closures.

*Saving the Enlightenment?*

To conclude let us go back to the beginning and let us consider metonymically the current discourse about “Radical Enlightenment” as a thesis about the heritage of the humanities in the 21st century. In the light of what has been said we can talk about the moral imperative as being tied to *Gleich-Gültigkeit*. Jonathan Israel for example produces a (controversial) narrative, which is based on a certain politics of time, that makes the law of the past the apriori of the present. We could call this manoeuvre a strive for gaining “absolute temporality”, i.e. the conviction, that in the past one can find theorems which are universally valid (i.e. Jonathan Israel thinks that the “Radical Enlightenment” already found the principles of “any progressive politics”). The basic epistemic techniques of the production of absolute temporality are different types of constructing infinity. What is at stake in this specific form of making the past infinite, is not only the debate between different rationalities, but also the intelligibility of history itself as a “critical ontology of ourselves”.

If we risk to presuppose that each form of production of infinity tends to totalize its own apriori we will have to conclude that for a *critical* project within the humanities it is of paramount importance not to participate in the parasitism of the general infinity of the humanities but rather to try to produce finiteness. One task of historical epistemology, it seems to us, is to analyze the strategies leading to infinity or to finiteness. As early as the 18th century Condillac had similarly made the distinction between two kinds of metaphysics: one proud, frivolous and therefore useless and the other one humble, dependant on observation and open to revision. However, he still adhered to the idea of methodological unity. But nowadays in a framework, in which global humanities seem realizable at least technically, humanities, as a center of the production of knowledge, will have to open up and make possible the fundamental falsification of all contents and methods. It does not suffice to merely think that falsification is possible or that it is a value, but to put it in practice within a radical symmetrical approach. This approach would tend to an *unconditional metaphysics* of historical epistemology. It would relate symmetrically to its object and would be responsible for including the determining factors of its projects in the analysis. The contingency of the project should be object of the project itself. Also the principles of “Radical Enlightenment” should be analyzed symmetrically. Jonathan Israel undstands them not only as universal principles for the “West”, but also for the states “that suffered most at its hands”. We will accordingly have to thematize the politics of time and not to depreciate clusters of deviant rationality as anachronisms. We will then be able to recognize these forms of
epistemic imperialism, this politics of closure, and to ask for alternative possibilities of epistemic plurality and openness.\textsuperscript{xli}

Thus, the individual results produced in our project are not as important as the production of a perspective on the temporality of knowledge and a training of our judgement in this regard. It is important to identify repressive forms of the production of the “denial of coevalness”.\textsuperscript{xlii} The problem of coevalness and its denial, as we tried to point out concerning the “Enlightenment”, can be seen as a major epistemological obstacle and problem of the humanities in the 21\textsuperscript{th} century. The self-proclaimed “saviours” of the Enlightenment are themselves an obstacle for such a reflection, which does not allow for their apocalyptic emergency discourses.

\section*{Literature}


Desroisières, Alain 1993. \textit{La politique des grands nombres. Histoire de la raison statistique}. Paris: La Dé-


The collapse of intellectual coherence on the left reflects the collapse of a purposeful politics from the left. Reconstructing such politics depends upon appropriating the Enlightenment to meet new conditions” (Bronner 2004: 1).

(Cf. e.g. (Israel 2010: 224, 235); (Israel 2011: 240).)

We understand contingency in the sense if contact. Etymologically it goes back to „cum tangere“, wich refers to a specific contact, a certain inter-relationsship of „construction“ and „situation“. Cf. (Serres 1994 [1985]: 104).

There were many projects. While Sicard was engaged in composing a „general grammar“ or an „universal grammar“, Volney tried to establish an empirical, comparative approach, which should have been based on the collection of vocabularies. Cf. (Blanckaert 2000), (Gessinger 1994), (Hofer-Sieber 2000), (Certeau et. al. 1975), (Staum 1996), (Rosenfeld 2001), (Göttert 1998).

For research dealing with Sicard cf. (Lane 1984), (Berthier 1873), (Buton 2008).

Martin Staum analyzed this politics of stability in a wider context. See (Staum 1996).

On 10th of November 1800 Duquesnoy reviewed a complaint of the professeurs adjoints of Sicard. In this complaint Sicard was denounce of not having success with his method. It was said that his method would not contribute to the education of the deaf-mutes and that it would retard their progress. Duquesnoy shared this opinion and – surprisingly – this was exactly the reason, why Sicard was politically welcome: In contrast to his professeurs adjoints Sicard was not believed to cause any trouble.

Cf. (Ginetse 2004).

Cf. (Shattuck 1994 [1980]), (Ginetse 2004 [1993]).

„Einfühlen“ or „Hineinfühlen“ is an heuristic term, which describes a certain espitemic tech- nique. It is difficult to translate. One could perhaps translate it as „understanding“, „sensitivity“ or „empathy“.

„Es ist [...] der bessere Weg, die Prüfung einer Sprache bei ihrem Totaleindruck anzufangen, es verbreitet sich alsdann wenigstens jenes Gefühl auf die ganze Folge der Untersuchung. Kehrt man es um, oder bleibt man gar bei der Zergliederung stehen, so erhält man eine lange Reihe von Analysen von Sprachen, ohne die wesentliche Eigentümlichkeit einer einzigen derselben zu erkennen oder zu fühlen“ (Humboldt 1907 [1830-1835]: 29).

Cf. (Berthier 1852). Berthier in this text tried to oppose this specific opinion of Itard.

Cf. (Ophir 2010), (Foucault 2007). „The state would be [...] a principle of intelligibility and strategic schema, or to use an anachronistic word [...] a regulatory idea“ (Foucault 2007: 375-376).

Cf. e.g. (Clastrès 1989). „The emergence of the state brought about the great typological between savage and civilized man; it created the unbridgeable gulf whereby [...] Time became History“ (ibd. 200).

„[...]Die Statistik [hat sich] nur mit dem neuesten Zustande der Staaten zu beschäftigen [...] ja sie enthält nur selbst die Darstellung des letzten oder neuesten Moments der Beschaffenheit der Staaten, in wie fern dieser auf, für die Gegenwart bestimmten, physischen und politischen, fixierten Punkten beruht“ (Meusel 1794: 1).

„Nur Menschengruppen, die in Staatsgesellschaften leben, sind einer Statistik fähig und würdig. Wilde haben bloß eine Natur-Kunde, die aber für den Menschenkenner großes Interesse hat“ (Schlözer 1804: 30).


„Le ministre veut refaire le bureau, & le rendre utile. Monsieur de Gerando (sic) veut que je lui donne mes vues, je lui obéis et je parlerai avec le cautionne que mérite le ministre [...]“ (Duquesnoy, Claude Adrien, AN F20 /103 /1-2).

„C’est dans l’étude de ces [the objects of statistics] changements sur-tout qu’est l’essence de la statistique. Cette science fondamentale de l’économie politique s’occupe uniquement de ce qui
est; elle est toute de faits. Il est donc de son ressort d’embrasser ces changemens successifs; elle ne peut s’arrêter un moment. Savoir ce qui est, et constater les effets de ce qui est sur le sort des hommes; voila son but” (Chaptal, Circulaire 28 Prairal an 12; AN F/1a/24 Circulaire An IX).

Cf. (Gierl 2011), (Lepenies 1978).

„Le ministre qui m’a créé le bureau de statistique avait en vue trois objets principaux […]: 1. connaitre exactement l’état de la france, le comparer autant qu’il était possible à son état en 1789 et calculer par là avec autant de soin qu’on pourrait les effets bons ou mauvais des changemens survenus depuis cette époque afin d’être à mesure de provoquer les loix et les règlemens nécessaires pour conserver, réparer ou rétablir. Il avait également pensé qu’il honorerait l’époque du 18 Brumaire et le gouvernement qu’il a commencé en constatant l’état de la France alors pleine d’esperance, à ce qu’il serait dix ans après quand ces espérances seraient réalisées. Ainsi il avait en vue le passé, le présent et l’avenir” (Duquesnoy, Claude Adrien, AN F20 /103 /1-2).

Cf. (Hacking 1990), (Desroisières 2005).

„Il paraît que personne dans ce bureau n’a soupconné que les faits puissent se vérifier les uns par les autres. Cependant tous ont des rapports associés et nécessaires entr’eux. Les mêmes causes qui modifient les uns apportent aussi des différences dans les autres. Après avoir considéré attentivement leurs relations, on peut souvent représenter leur loi par des équations” (Duvillard 1977 [1806]: 440).

Cf. (Chappey 2006), who describes, that the “Science de l’Homme” was a crucial resource for the government in the years between 1795 and 1802. It was an inherently “republican” venture wich was to be replaced, according to Chappey, by the separation of the branches of knowledge after 1802.

The existence of the revolutionary calender from 1792 until the end of 1805 illustrates the symbolic power of the politics of time.

Cf. (Blanckaert 2000). A wider analysis would have to analyze also the static infinity, which mostly could be found in the 16th and 17th century. We can not deal with this question here. Concerning the question of the practices of the production of temporality in the humanities today, however, the analysis of the different types of iterative and analytic infinity will have to suffice in this context.

„Spinoza […] more than any other, forged the basic metaphysical groundplan, exclusively secular, moral values, and culture of individual liberty, democratic politics, and freedom of thought and the press, that embody today the defining core values of modern secular egalitarianism: that is to say, of Radical Enlightenment” (Israel 2010: 240-241).

Here Jonathan Israel cites Stephen Bronner approvingly: „Enlightenent thinking remains the best foundation for any genuinely progressive politics not simply in the West but in those states that suffered most at its hands” (Israel 2006: 159).

In the field of de-colonial studies much has been said about these issues. Cf. e.g. (Mignolo 2009), (Castro-Goméz/Grosfoguel 2007).

Cf. (Fabian 1983).